Showing posts with label Network Neutrality. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Network Neutrality. Show all posts

Friday, May 24, 2013

Arlington v. FCC: What it Means for Net Neutrality

[Cross-posted on Freedom to Tinker]

On Monday, the Supreme Court handed down a decision in Arlington v. FCC. At issue was a very abstract legal question: whether the FCC has the right to interpret the scope of its own authority in cases in which congress has left the contours of their jurisdiction ambiguous. In short, can the FCC decide to regulate a specific activity if the statute could reasonably be read to give them that authority? The so-called Chevron doctrine gives deference to administrative agencies' interpretation of of their statutory powers, and the court decided that this deference extends to interpretations of their own jurisdiction. It's all very meta, but it turns out that it could be a very big deal indeed for one of those hot-button tech policy issues: net neutrality.

Scalia wrote the majority opinion, which is significant for reasons I will describe below. The opinion demonstrated a general skepticism of the telecom industry claims, and with classic Scalia snark, he couldn't resist this footnote about the petitioners, "CTIA—The Wireless Association":

This is not a typographical error. CTIA—The Wireless Association was the name of the petitioner. CTIA is presumably an (unpronounceable) acronym, but even the organization’s website does not say what it stands for. That secret, known only to wireless-service-provider insiders, we will not disclose here.

Monday, February 1, 2010

The Internet and Common Carriage

I spent this past weekend at the Silicon Flatirons broadband conference in Boulder. The gathering draws telecom lawyers, academics, and advocates for a discussion about policy issues in broadband. The Silicon Flatirons community is also responsible for a very good journal (now open access!), and the 2005 book Digital Crossroads (co-written by former Executive Director Phil Weiser and his friend Jonathan Nuechterlein). Nuechterlein is a brilliant telecom attorney, and although Digital Crossroads is fundamental to my understanding of internet law, I find myself in eternal disagreement with his policy positions.

We are all currently awaiting the conclusion of the Comcast/Bittorrent case in DC Circuit Court, which will determine whether the FCC has jurisdiction to enforce its so-called "four internet freedoms" (I described the issues way back when this fight started a year and a half ago). In parallel, the Commission is conducting a proceeding to determine whether it should more explicitly establish "open internet" rules. Neuchterlein generally does not like anything resembling ex ante regulatory obligations on telecom infrastructure providers -- certainly not from the perspective of his clients (like AT&T), and apparently not as a matter of personal opinion either. I disagree, as I have described elsewhere (footnote 161, etc.).

But that's old news. This year there's a new twist. Historically telecommunications were regulated under Title II of the Communications Act, and were referred to "common carriers" (or "telecommunications services"). Under this regime, carriers had to remain non-discriminatory in their service, and were subjected to a host of arguably overbearing price controls and the like. Between 1998 and 2005, the FCC effectively "deregulated" broadband by classifying it under the vague Title I (redefining it from a "telecommunications service" to an "information service"). This took seven years due to a series of court cases that ultimately put the issue in front of the Supreme Court, which affirmed the FCC's authority to classify broadband however it wished. If the FCC loses the Comcast case, it will likely consider whether to re-classify broadband under Title II so as to regain authority to regulate. Susan Crawford has a great description of the state of play.

Nuechterlein thinks that reclassification would be horrible. First, he is afraid of the many onerous elements of Title II that are unrelated to the policy goals of the "open internet" crowd. The FCC has the power to "forbear" from enforcing any or all of these, but Nuechterlein doesn't think they would. Second, he claims reclassification would confer very comprehensive regulation on FCC for "all corners of the internet ecosystem." In particular, he claims that application and content providers like Google and Netflix would fall within reach of the long arm of common carriage. You can see him make the case in the video below, starting at 1:23:00:



Even if Nuechterlein is right, these developments can be seen as direct backlash for years of chipping away at anything resembling regulation. After winning the battle to reclassify broadband, these entities continued to push against the notion that the FCC retained any authority at all to regulate. Harold Feld has argued that keeping oversight in a vaguely defined ex post arena serves incumbents' goals of maintaining the appearance of jurisdiction without any practical authority. However, the Comcast case threatens to expose this ruse (assuming the FCC does lose the case) and re-introduce the specter of Title II.

To be fair, opponents of FCC jurisdiction or ex ante regulation have proposed theoretical alternatives. Weiser, Nuechterlein, and others in the Silicon Flatirons community have long argued for antitrust-like ex post enforcement. Their proposals for how it would be implemented evolve from year to year, but more importantly the practical hurdles to achieving it seem very hard to overcome. [Edit: Speta just came out with an article suggesting yet another variation on the antitrust-like approach.] I have described elsewhere (pp. 118-122) how I think that framing this solely as an antitrust question misses the point, and in my most pessimistic moments I am sympathetic with those that claim it is just a euphemism for doing nothing.

I do agree in part with Nuechterlein's first point -- that bringing the full force of Title II to bear on broadband would be a bad thing. Perhaps he is better at predicting how forbearance will play out than I am. Given that he wrote the book on the matter, I suppose this is likely. On the other hand, we do have ample evidence of Commission forbearance. Indeed, even as the FCC reclassified all broadband services under Title I, it noted that some operators may wish to continue to operate under Title II, and it preemptively chose to forbear from tariffing (see paras. 89-94). Maybe it is a bit like chipping away at Pike's Peak in order to carve a statue, but we are left with few alternatives. In any case, Title II at least carries a rich legacy of non-discrimination norms... even if it also carries baggage.

I am not remotely convinced of his second major claim -- that bringing broadband under Title II necessarily implicates a host of higher-level services in its regulation (like Netflix, Google, and VoIP [edit: although in the case of VoIP there may already be some limited jurisdiction]). We have a very rich history of distinguishing between transport providers and the services that are delivered over that infrastructure. The 2005 Supreme Court Brand X decision affirming the FCC's classification decision mangles these distinctions and is frankly a mess. To the extent that the description of the technology made sense in its time, it is largely inaccurate today, as described by Public Knowledge. In the course of the Brand X litigation, MCI had been making the argument that any information service that made use of a telecommunications service would necessarily be subject to common carriage. The majority opinion notes,

[Respondents] claim that the Communications Act unambiguously classifies as telecommunications carriers all entities that use telecommunications inputs to provide information service. As respondent MCI concedes, this argument would subject to mandatory common-carrier regulation all information-service providers that use telecommunications as an input to provide information service to the public.


Nuechterlein claims that reclassification would necessarily validate this argument. There are two problems with this. First, the MCI argument on its merits is at odds with decades of precedent that distinguishes between regulatory treatment these two types of services. Second, the Court was discussing this argument in the context of whether the FCC had unreasonably interpreted statute, rather than proactively determining what would necessarily follow if the Commission decided to classify broadband under Title II. In that sense, Nuechterlein and I both agree with the Court: MCI's argument isn't going to fly.

If the Commission were ultimately to classify broadband under Title II, it might be a workable means of gaining necessary jurisdiction to do good policy. It is not without its risks, but I think that the risks are far less severe than Nuechterlein's straw men.

In the final panel of Day 2, Marc Berejka of the Commerce Department observed (starting 2:17:00 in the video) that the hardest thing about doing good internet policy is that we don't have good governance tools. Regardless of what the Commission does in the short run with respect to broadband classification, we need to seriously reconsider the structure of communications regulation, all the way back to first principles and enabling statute.

Bonus: Yesterday, CITP hosted Chris McDonald, who talked about "The Computer Utility and the First Computer-Communications Policy Debate." He gave a very good overview of the first round of debates in this area. The audio is now available.

Friday, February 13, 2009

Chris Riley on Comcast, BitTorrent, and Network Neutrality

Yesterday, the Berkman Center and Harvard Journal of Law and Technology co-hosted a talk by Chris Riley, Policy Counsel for Free Press. Chris gave:

a brief history of the Comcast proceeding and other net neutrality legal efforts, and then dives into a substantive policy discussion of present and future Congressional and Commission net neutrality proceedings.

You can watch the video here.

Monday, December 15, 2008

WSJ on Google and Net Neutrality - DEVELOPING



I have done the only sensible thing and put up a Drudge siren. It's appropriate given the level of research and care that went into today's Wall Street Journal article claiming, "Google Inc. has approached major cable and phone companies that carry Internet traffic with a proposal to create a fast lane for its own content, according to documents reviewed by The Wall Street Journal."

Suffice to say, the authors got it fundamentally wrong. They failed to understand basic networking concepts like colocation versus discrimination. Richard Whitt (full disclosure: my old boss and co-author of a forthcoming paper) wrote a charitable but biting reply. The best summary I've seen so far is actually this compendium of quotes: OMG! WSJ net-neutrality own-goal....

I'll keep updating this post as the brawl unfolds. Suffice to say, if you're looking for evidence of the mainstream press under-performing compared to the blog-o-sphere-o-pedia-space... look no further. WSJ has become Drudge, and the blogs are actually getting the story right.

And with that, all I can say is DEVELOPING...

  • At 12:49pm, the WSJ posts "Discussing Net Neutrality" which notes, "Today’s Journal story on Google's plans to develop a fast track for its own content has certainly gotten a rise out of the blogosphere." Commenters, including Dan Gillmor, ask them why they aren't retracting or correcting the story.
  • At 4:23pm, another WSJ post, "What's Edge Caching?," pulls quotes from blogs describing edge caching, generally making the case that although it is a common and well-known practice, this case is different.
Comedy Central's Indecision 2008: Obama Reassures Nerds on Net Neutrality:

Cheeto-stained keyboards all over the country were burning up this morning after The Wall Street Journal reported that President-elect Obama was flip-flopping on his pro-net-neutrality position and Google was in secret talks to buy preferential treatment for their content from service providers. But as it turns out, WSJ were just ObamaOpposesNetNeutralityRolling us.

And the surge of criticism:

Friday, November 14, 2008

Tim Lee's Reasonable Retorts

Tim Lee has posted two responses to my critique of his recent article on network neutrality. In his article, he argued that network neutrality is good but that violations of the principle are unlikely to be severe for economic and technical reasons. I find this argument unpersuasive, and he responded with four basic retorts:


1. Net Neutrality proponents don't clearly state what they are seeking to prevent, and thus evade any attempt to disprove their harms.

I’ve found that any time I take one of these ISP strategies seriously and put forth an argument about why it’s unlikely to be feasible or profitable, the response from supporters of regulation is often to concede that the particular scenario I’ve chosen is not realistic...

Lee goes on to list several scenarios, all of which are possible to varying degrees. However, they all fit the simple rubric of network discrimination and they all are harmful. In general, subtle discrimination is more likely than outright blocking. This is something that has been clearly articulated by the mainstream of neutrality proponents for some time. That is why I included reference to Barbara van Schewick's paper. If Tim were choosing to "take one of these ISP strategies seriously" he would have done well to focus on the one that most people are talking about.


2. This type of discrimination is unlikely, isn't that bad, and we can always fix it after the fact.

First, notice that the kind of discrimination he’s describing here is much more modest than the scenarios commonly described by network neutrality activists. Under the scenario he’s describing, all current Internet applications will continue to work for the foreseeable future, and any new Internet applications that can work with current levels of bandwidth will work just fine. If this is how things are going to play out, we’ll have plenty of time to debate what to do about it after the fact.

I am describing a mainstream version of discrimination, which can happen either right now or going forward as operators upgrade their networks but keep non-payers in the slow lane. We have ample evidence of the former in Comcast/BitTorrent. The latter is simply a less visible version of the former -- an even further degree away from Lee's scenario in which consumers have "a taste of freedom", "become acutely aware of any new restrictions," and, "stubbornly refuse efforts to impose them." The fact that carriers are building out faster networks doesn't tell us whether or not this is likely. Carriers will of course build out faster networks, because they typically profit more from them (whether they impose discrimination or not). Given the current uncertain regulatory climate, it is no surprise that they have refrained from additional large-scale discrimination. This climate, however, is temporary. The relevant question is whether or not those network upgrades provide additional shield from the customer backlash that Lee posits. It is clear that they do.

How bad you think this discrimination is depends on how seriously you take arguments about platform economies, dynamic innovation, network effects, and freedom of speech. It also depends on whether or not you think that degrading service achieves most of the ends of outright blocking. I argue that it does. Google's obsession with page load times is not simply because they are hyper-focused engineers. Skype's need for equal network treatment is not just because they want calls to sound nice. The BitTorrent protocol's expectation that connections are not randomly reset is not a matter of convenience.

Lee would have us believe that we will always have the space to regulate these issues, if needed, after the fact. The Comcast order might give us some hope in this regard, except for the tremendous murkiness that surrounds the decision, its implications, and its legal durability. Regulation from the FCC can be roughly thought to fall into two categories: rulemaking and adjudication. Rulemaking explicitly sets out the detailed requirements, whereas adjudication defines basic guidelines and then builds policy through case-by-case enforcement. Lee clearly opposes rulemaking on its face. We are left with adjudication, but in this case he opposes further definition of enforceable principles. This is not ex post regulation, it is no regulation at all.


3. The risks are overblown, and disproved by history.

It’s worth remembering that alarmism about the future of the Web is almost as old as the Web itself.

Lee is not a fan of Lessig's "apocalyptic" predictions in 1999. While Lessig's forecasts undoubtedly have not fully come true ("yet" -- as he notes in the preface to the new edition), we have unquestionably seen some of those trends play out. Increasing control by intermediaries, domestically and abroad, threatens speech and innovation. The "open access" battle that was heating up at that time was not lost until 2005, and since then we have case studies for how the stopgap quasai-neutrality principles are strained. But, I'm not here to defend Lessig (I certainly disagree strongly with him at times).

Rather than debating generally whether past predictions of others have come true, it is more productive to examine the specific issues at hand with the most relevant data points from history and the present. We know that historically corporations tended toward building closed systems like AOL and CompuServe. We know that well-crafted regulatory interventions like common carrier non-discrimination, Computer II, and Carterphone unleashed waves of innovation. We know that carriers today have pursued discriminatory practices and been partially disciplined by somewhat ambiguous regulation. We know that abroad, discriminatory practices have flourished in environments in which intermediaries exercise the most control. We know that domestically in the parallel (and increasingly overlapping) wireless market, market actors impose restrictions that radically limit innovation.

This is not a strong historical or factual case against the need for, or success of, non-discrimination regulation.


4. Steve misunderstands settlement-free peering.

“Settlement-free” means that no money exchanges hands. If D and E are peers [this example assumes that D is a "last mile" backbone provider like Verizon and E and F are competitive "tier 1" providers such as Level 3 or Global Crossing], that by definition means that E pays D nothing to carry its traffic, and vice versa.

This technical/wonky definition is at the heart of what I consider Lee's most original, but nevertheless misguided, argument. The basic idea he posits is that because a certain set of backbone providers traditionally negotiate no-fee interconnection agreements, there is no ability for last-mile providers to leverage their power in the consumer market into the backbone market.

Let's go back and define a couple of key terms. First, "settlement-free peering" means, as Lee accurately describes, an arrangement between two providers in which they do not exchange money but simply agree to carry each others' traffic. They do so under detailed and confidential interconnection agreements that define the terms of this agreement, including things like jitter, latency, throughput, etc. These agreements often require equal treatment by both parties (although they may not speak to those providers' relationships with other providers). Let's assume for the sake of argument that they always do require equal treatment between the two. The types of companies that have these agreements are "Tier 1" backbone providers at the core of the internet -- Level 3, Sprint, AT&T, etc.

Second, "transit" agreements are contractual relationships between unequals. In this case, one party typically pays the other for carrying its traffic under various terms. This is the type of relationship that Comcast has with the Tier 1 providers. For example, here is an excerpt of the traceroute from my Comcast cable modem to google.com:

7 pos-0-3-0-0-cr01.chicago.il.ibone.comcast.net (68.86.90.57)
8 xe-10-1-0.edge1.newyork2.level3.net (4.78.169.45)
9 ae-2-79.edge1.newyork1.level3.net (4.68.16.78)
10 google-inc.edge1.newyork1.level3.net (4.71.172.86)

See that? My packets go from Comcast -> L3 -> Google. Comcast pays Level 3 to transmit their packets, according to some confidential terms that it agrees to. Comcast has a rather large national network (although it is not a "Tier 1" provider) and thus can route its packets around to locations where it has the best bargaining power with the party at the exchange point (in this case, they sent my packets from Boston to Chicago before plugging into L3). Lee's theory is that the settlement-free peering agreements probably don't allow discrimination based on content or source, and he seems to assume that downstream transit agreements are implicated in this obligation because at some point they must interconnect with those backbone providers. Furthermore, he claims that both parties need each other enough that nobody would ever violate these principles.

In my initial critique, I gave several reasons to doubt this claim. First, there is no practical evidence that Tier 1 providers have pressured their downstream transit peers to remain non-discriminatory. This has not been a factor in discrimination disputes that we have seen to date, like Comcast/BitTorrent or Madison River (instead, regulatory threats have brought players in line). Second, there is ample reason to believe that Tier 1 providers would indeed be willing to de-peer despite Lee's assertion that they simply need each other too much (thus I cite the Cogent/L3 dispute as well as the Cogent/Sprint de-peering from a couple of weeks ago). Third, the universe of settlement-free peering is increasingly giving way to varieties of transit agreements in which concessions are made in exchange for payment. Fourth, there are now emerging unified backbone/last-mile networks for which much of the traffic need not pass through a Tier-1 exchange point at all (eg. Verizon/MCI/UUNET). Settlement-free peering has been a powerful norm in keeping content or source-based discrimination out of the core of the network, but even there their strength is waning.

Wednesday, November 12, 2008

Tim Lee's Twin Fallacies

[Edit: Tim replies. I reply.]

Cato has finally gotten around to publishing Tim Lee's article, "The Durable Internet: Preserving Network Neutrality without Regulation." I first saw a draft of his paper in March, and Tim engaged in a good spirited back-and-forth with me over email. The primary failings that I perceived then remain un-addressed in this final version. They are twofold:


1. The fallacy that any non-discrimination regulation is the same as the combined force of all misguided regulation since the advent of administrative agencies

The first problem with Lee's article is that it repeats one of the most common mistakes of certain libertarian sects: assuming that any government regulation is as bad as all government regulation. In Lee's case, the devilish regulation equated with network neutrality is the Interstate Commerce Act, the Civil Aeronautics Board, and the sum of all Federal Communications Commission regulation. This approach mirrors earlier claims by Bruce Owen, Larry Downes, and Adam Thierer, which I rebut here.

Lee begins by observing that "The language of the Interstate Commerce Act was strikingly similar to the network neutrality language being considered today." We should not be surprised that at least some of the non-discriminatory principles found in modern day neutrality proposals resemble those in the ICA. Indeed, net neutrality is inspired in part by elements of common carriage, which cross-pollinated into communications law in the 1910 Mann-Elkins Act (see pp. 21-23 of my thesis for more on this history). The gating question is whether or not the elements of the Interstate Commerce Commission that led to the inefficiencies that Lee claims are at all related to the non-disciminatory language that he claims connect the two. If and only if the answer is "yes," then a responsible analysis would consider whether or not the markets are relatively analogous, whether or not the administrative agencies tend toward the same failures, and whether the costs of regulation truly outweigh the benefits. In short, it is not enough to simply assert that net neutrality smells like the ICA, therefore it is doomed to fail.

I won't discuss the relationship to the Civil Aeronautics Board because I think the analogies are tenuous at best.

Finally, we arrive at the FCC discussion, which holds the most promise for actually being relevant. Unlike Bruce Owen, who inexplicably compares neutrality proposals to the AT&T antitrust proceedings, Lee seeks to equate neutrality with FCC rate-subsidization and market entry prohibitions. He concludes that, "like the ICC and the CAB, the FCC protected a client industry from the vagaries of markets and competition." Perhaps, but why is this similar to non-discrimination regulation?

A more accurate analogy with FCC rulemaking would be to compare neutrality to the non-disciminatory part of common carriage, the Computer Inquiries, Carterphone, or all three. Most scholars recognize that these rules allowed the discrimination-free operation of dial-up ISPs, and facilitated the explosion of the internet. The case of FCC non-discrimination mandates presents a stark counter-example to Lee's assertion of uniform regulatory failure.


2. The fallacy that there is an underlying "durability" of the technology/market structures of the internet that will successfully resist strong carrier incentives

Lee provides a somewhat novel argument when he claims that the internet has built in safeguards against welfare-harming practices like network discrimination. He begins by praising the effects of the "end-to-end" architecture of the internet, in which carriers simply deliver data and allow the "edges" of the network to determine what is sent and how. He thinks that this characteristic does not need to be backed up by regulators because the technology and the market will preserve it.

With respect to markets, his argument is twofold. First he claims that outright "blocking" of services would cause such backlash (from end-users or from content providers) that it would be untenable. Second, he claims that attempts to simply degrade service would not be terribly destructive in the short term, and would provide ample time to craft a regulatory response if necessary.

Lee justifies his customer backlash theory by pointing to cases such as the Verizon/NARAL dispute in which the company initially refused to give the non-profit an SMS "short code" but relented in the face of public outcry. In reality, the outcry came from inside-the-beltway advocates who threatened regulation, but in any event we have a more relevant example in the case of BitTorrent/Comcast, which he also discusses. The regulatory solution in this case is even more obvious, with the FCC ultimately issuing an order against the company (which is now on appeal). There is no evidence whatsoever that these resolutions were driven by users that have "had a taste of freedom" and have, "become acutely aware of any new restrictions," and, "stubbornly refuse efforts to impose them" -- resisting via technical or financial means. Nor is there evidence that, left alone, the markets would have settled on a non-discriminatory solution.

Lee tries to make the case that the technical structure of the internet would have allowed BitTorrent users to simply adopt better ways of hiding their traffic, and would have prevailed in that cat-and-mouse game. This is of course speculation, but it's also irrelavent. Whether or not highly technically savvy users can temporarily evade discrimination has little to do with how such practices would effect the activities of the majority of the population. In fact, we have strong examples to the contrary worldwide, as various regimes develop more and more sophisticated means for filtering their citizens' speech (such as the news today from Argentina). In those situations, there are often many people who can subvert the filters but the practice nevertheless fundamentally alters the nature of what is said, and what innovations flourish (see for example, the rollout and adoption of Google vs. Baidu in China).

Lee also lays out an argument for why the structure of the network itself makes it unlikely that last-mile carriers can successfully threaten blocking. He argues that because the core of the internet is highly interconnected, it would be practically impossible to discriminate against any particular site, and that those sites which are important enough to pay attention to could in turn threaten to stop serving customers from that carrier. In short, they need each other. In many cases this is true, although it doesn't necessarily mean that in all cases this relationship will be more attractive to the last-mile provider when compared to various exclusive relationships (or that even if it is, the provider will behave rationally). Things get even more dicey when we examine them from the perspective of second-tier sites or services, which have not yet achieved the "must have" status but nevertheless present revenue opportunities or competitive risk to the carriers.

Lee claims that even if this occurred, it would not be a real problem because it wouldn't be severe. "To be sure, such discrimination would be a headache for these firms, but a relatively small chance of being cut off from a minority of residential customers is unlikely to rank very high on an entrepreneur’s list of worries." His assumption that the chance of being cut off is "small" is belied by recent experience in the Comcast/BitTorrent case. The idea that one would be cut off only from a "minority of residential customers" is technically true because no one firm currently controls over 50% of residential connections, but there are some truly significant market shares that entrepreneurs would undoubtedly care about. Last-mile providers have duopoly over their subscribers, and a "terminating access" monopoly over current subscribers.

These problems are all made much more severe in an environment in which carriers practice partial discrimination rather than outright blocking. In our email back-and-forth, I told Lee that:

The notion that "D cant' degrade them all, because that would make D's Internet service completely useless" does not hold when you assume that D maintains a baseline level of connectivity (perhaps even at current levels of service) but only offers enhanced delivery to services/sites that pay up. Consumers don't see any change, but the the process of network-wide innovation gives way to source/application-based tiering. Imagine this starting in the era of dialup (you'd have to imagine away the last-mile common carrier safeguards in that scenario). Today I'd only get web-based video from ABC, Disney, etc.

The last-mile carrier "D" need not block site "A" or start charging everyone extra to access it, it need only degrade (or maintain current) quality of service to nascent A (read: Skype, YouTube, BitTorrent) to the point that it is less useable. This is neither a new limitation (from the consumers perspective) nor an explicit fee. If one a user suddenly lost all access to 90% of the internet, the last-mile carrier could not keep their business (or at least price). But, discrimination won't look like that. It will come in the form of improving video services for providers who pay. It will come in the form of slightly lower quality Skyping which feels ever worse as compared to CarrierCrystalClearIP. It will come in the form of [Insert New Application] that I never find out about because it couldn't function on the non-toll internet and the innovators couldn't pay up or were seen as competitors. As Barbara van Schewick observes, carriers have the incentive and ability to discriminate in this fashion.

Finally, Lee makes the argument that the current norm of "settlement-free" peering in the backbone of the internet will restrict last-mile providers' ability to discriminate and to create a two-tiered internet because they will be bound by the equal treatment terms of the agreements. This is not supported by practical evidence, given the fact that none of the push-back against existing discriminatory practices has come from network peers. It is also not supported by sound economic reasoning. It is certainly not in backbone-provider E's business interest to raise prices for all of its customers (an inevitable result). But, assuming E does negotiate for equal terms, the best-case scenario is that E becomes a more expensive "premium" backbone provider by paying monopoly rents to last-mile provider D, while F becomes a "budget" backbone provider by opting out (and hence attracts the "budget" customers).

We are already seeing cracks in the dam of settlement-free peering. The Cogent/L3 meltdown happened between two backbone-only providers and was in the context of volume-based disagreements. Two weeks ago, Sprint disconnected from Cogent because of a dispute over sharing. When you add the only recent pressure of last-mile leveraging and discrimination-based disagreements, these dynamics are troubling. Lee is making the case that history is on his side, but he doesn't have much supporting history to draw from. Common carriage prevented last-mile discrimination until 2005. Kevin Werbach, on the other hand, sees major risks from emerging market power, specialized peering, and what he calls possible "Tier 0" arrangements between vertically integrated providers. The Verizon/MCI/UUNET network was only recently unified, creating something close to this type of an arrangement.


Conclusion

Tim Lee's article repeats but then goes beyond the standard refrain of no-government-regulation libertarianism. However, his novel arguments for why the internet will take care of itself are not persuasive. Ultimately, we are left with his well-put argument for the benefits of network neutrality, but without any assurances that it will be preserved. Into this vacuum might flow reasonable discussion of how targeted government regulation might be the only means of achieving the ends we both seek.

Saturday, August 2, 2008

A Reply to Nachbar, Part 2

Last week, I posted a critique of Thomas Nachbar's latest paper. That post primarily addressed his general argument against "use"-based non-discrimination rules. In this in-progress excerpt from my thesis, I critique his specific argument against the openness conditions on the recent 700 MHz "C"-block spectrum auction.

===

The Commission’s final order struck a compromise on many of the issues at stake.[1] The “open devices”/”open applications” rules were adopted, while the more aggressive openness proposals were not incorporated. When bidding concluded months later, it was revealed that Google had indeed bid up to the reserve price on the “C” block but that Verizon had cast the winning bid. Telecommunications analyst Blair Levin quipped that because of the openness conditions on Verizon, “Google is the happy loser.”[2] Of course Google had a clear business interest in maintaining users ability to access their services. Likewise, the wireless carriers perceived a business interest in retaining the ability to control what users could do on their networks. While the news reports were dominated by analysis of which big company really “won,” many missed the more fundamental public interest issues at stake.

The openness conditions in many ways mirror traditional non-discrimination public interest safeguards. The conditions seek to preserve the freedom of users to use the network as they choose, and to access it with any device that did not cause harm to the network. The former resembles a weaker form of Computer Inquiries application non-discrimination, and the latter condition mirrors the Carterphone decision of 1968.[3] There are many potential loopholes in the rules. Indeed, no sooner had the rules been decided than Verizon began lobbying for a weak interpretation and Google began counter-lobbying.[4] I described earlier why I think that the combination of common carriage, the Computer Inquiries, and Carterphone were necessary for an environment that fostered the flourishing of early consumer internet access. In the wireless context, I believe that similar flexibility of use is essential to maintaining historical non-discriminatory access in this new medium, as well as preserving the internet ethos that has led to innovation and free speech online.

Thomas Nachbar believes that defining this use neutrality is too difficult, that regulators will tend to define in such a way that it constrains innovation, that the rules will not affect positive behavior anyway, and that the competitive market will better solve any concerns.[5] Undoubtedly, the “openness” conditions in the 700 MHz auction were defined at a high level, and were a result of political compromise. Of course, the Commission has long promulgated broad principles or rules to guide industry behavior and then specified particular guidelines or adjudicated on individual bases.[6] Nachbar goes on to claim that the rules were defined, “in a specific, technologically dependent formula,”[7] and that “imposing use neutrality requires addressing questions of design.”[8] This claim is hard to understand, given that the mandate to allow all devices and applications is clearly divorced from particular technologies and indeed is designed to open the possibility to unforeseen technologies. This is the heart of technology-agnostic network modularity. Nachbar would also have us believe that the rules represent only a weak form of Carterphone, which by itself will be ineffective.[9] This ignores the full implications of the open applications provision, which extends the non-discriminatory mandate into the network.[10] It appears that Nachbar and I agree that two-sided openness (user device and network access) would be necessary to encourage meaningful openness, but that we disagree as to whether this can be done through wireless use neutrality.[11] Nachbar instead sees promise in profit-motivated market actors. He makes much of the somewhat competitive wireless carrier market.[12] However, it is clear that carriers all share similar incentives to discriminate against content, and that there is no competitor that offers comparable non-discriminatory service. AT&T recently stated explicitly that its wireless network does not respect network non-discrimination, and that its terms of service – “which are similar to those of other wireless providers” – categorically prohibit all peer-to-peer use.[13]

Ultimately, Nachbar’s critique of the 700 MHz “openness” rules focuses almost entirely on competition-based analysis of the rules (which, even on its own terms, I consider to be deeply misguided). Missing from his analysis is any consideration of whether the 700 MHz use neutrality rules map to historical non-discrimination norms. This is odd, considering his masterful exposition of these norms earlier in his paper. Ultimately, the non-discriminatory considerations in the wireless space are parallel to the network neutrality debate overall, and my conclusions here are essentially the same as my conclusions there. As with wireline, wireless operators face genuine network congestion challenges. Content and application-based discrimination is one way of dealing with these challenges. There are many other approaches – including discrimination that is not content or application-based[14] – that do not present so directly threaten free speech, innovation, and established norms.

[1] Second Report and Order. FCC 07-132. (Rel. August 10, 2007).

[2] "Verizon and AT&T Win Big in Auction of Spectrum," New York Times, March 21, 2008. by Saul Hansell.

[3] Tim Wu, Wireless Carterfone. International Journal of Communication, Vol. 1, p. 389, 2007
Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=962027

[4] Letter from Richard S. Whitt, Google, WT Docket No. 06-150, (October 1, 2007).

[5] Nachbar, 80-89.

[6] Elsewhere, Nachbar endorses precisely this approach. (at. 90)

[7] Nachbar, at 81

[8] Nachbar, at 88

[9] “The rules adopt a version of what has become known as ‘Wireless Carterfone’.” Nachbar, at 81.

[10] To be sure, whether or not this is the case could be disputed. Nachbar’s narrow interpretation is that the provision only limits “the ability of carriers to prevent consumers from loading and running third applications on those openly accessible devices.” (at 81). Even if the 700 MHz rules as adopted did not effectively mandate use neutrality in the network, this does not mean that the approach should be abandoned altogether but rather that such rules should perhaps be more explicitly defined. I am considerably more hopeful that it is possible to do this than is Nachbar. This is essentially the same question that plays out in the broader network neutrality debate, which I discussed earlier.

[11] Nachbar states that, “from a consumer standpoint, the product is the combination of device (or application) and carriage.” (at 82) I agree. I remain confused, however, about why he sings the praises of the Computer Inquiries while maintaining that use neutrality is categorically a bad idea. I am not persuaded by the argument that the IP environment fundamentally different from the circuit-switched environment in such a way that use neutrality is impossible or undesirable.

[12] “But the wireless markets of today are not like the wireline market that AT&T operated in years ago. Today’s wireless carriers face 2 competitors in over 90% of their markets, and therefore have far less market power than AT&T did.” (Nachbar at 82) Nachbar goes on to perform an analysis of the market incentives of wireless operators that I believe is fundamentally flawed on several accounts. He begins by noting the “internalizing complementary efficiencies” phenomenon and claiming that, “If wireless carriers actually do have market power, then opening device and application markets to competition will have no effect on their ability to charge monopoly rents.” (at 82.) Of course, neither of us thinks that wireless carriers are strict monopolists, and thus the ICE exception is irrelevant. On the other hand, these similarly situated companies sometimes resemble an oligopoly, with strong incentives to leverage market power into adjacent markets. Because they face potential competition on price, speed, and device exclusivity, they are motivated to increase switching costs and customer lock-in. I am puzzled by Nachbar’s assertion that "carriers are selling a commodified, undifferentiated service (carriage)," given the ample evidence that carriers are in fact differentiating between content, and Nachbar’s own claim that in IP carriers are motivated to differentiate in a way that they were not in the circuit-switched environment. Nachbar then claims that any market power being exercised is likely coming from the device manufacturers instead, citing the iPhone-AT&T tie-up and the fact that the iPhone has lured many customers to AT&T. Of course, one might just as easily conclude that it was precisely the distorted wireless carrier market that motivated Apple to strike the exclusive deal. In any event, despite the perennial appearance of blockbuster devices, the device market is far more diverse and competitive than the carrier market. Furthermore, the device market continues to move toward open platforms of its own accord, with device juggernaut Nokia announcing the open-sourcing of its operating system on the eve of the launch of Google’s own free and open source “Android” mobile operating system (Nokia. Press Release (June 24, 2008). "Nokia to acquire Symbian Limited to enable evolution of the leading open mobile platform" http://www.nokia.com/A4136001?newsid=1230415. Open Handset Alliance Press Release (November 5, 2007). "Industry Leaders Announce Open Platform for Mobile Devices" http://www.openhandsetalliance.com/press_110507.html). What’s more, it is hard to imagine any strong device leveraging as general-purpose computers increasingly become one of the key devices using wireless internet. Despite such developments, if carriers insist on discriminatory practices, the same bottleneck to innovation remains: use neutrality of government-granted spectrum. Critics of non-discrimination mandates on wireless spectrum raise myriad concerns that such requirements restrict possible business plans. They undoubtedly do. The relevant question is whether or not this benefits or harms overall innovation, growth, and public interest.

[13] Letter from Robert Quinn, AT&T, WT Docket No. 06-150, (July 25, 2008).

[14] Geoffrey Goodell, Allan Friedman, Scott Bradner. "Scarcity, Discrimination, and Transparency: Understanding Network Management" (Paper to be presented at TPRC 2008 Conference, Saturday September 27, 2008).

===

Monday, July 28, 2008

Comcast Order: What to expect Aug 1 and beyond

When several media outlets simultaneously report upcoming FCC decisions, you can be sure of one thing: one of the commissioners leaked it. That's what happened this past Friday, when AP, WSJ, and others all noted that "according to FCC officials," three of the five Commissioners voted to find that Comcast was in violation of FCC policy. Those three Commissioners will undoubtedly be Chairman Martin, Commissioner Copps, and Commissioner Adelstein. Today, Commissioner McDowell published a Washington Post Op-Ed [which Mark Cooper answered] that all but declared that he was going to vote against the measure. The official vote will go down this Friday, August 1.

[Update: Oh snap! The politicking is bleeding into the WSJ Op-Ed page, and the NYT Op-Ed page too. And now we've got the house Republican minority leader trashing the decision on the eve of its announcement.]

The word from inside the beltway was that it was touch-and-go for the last week as to whether or not the order was going to go through. The biggest debate appeared to be complex jurisdictional issues. Comcast has been arguing 1) that the Commission could not enforce the non-binding 2005 "policy statement" without first passing rules and 2) that in any event it lacked statutory authority to intervene based on broadband's "deregulated" Title I status. Martin himself said in 2005 that, "policy statements do not establish rules nor are they enforceable documents." This thrilling administrative law debate went roughly as follows:

Free Press: The FCC has jurisdiction to act, based on 8 different statutory sources. Also, the FCC frequently exercises its power to act via adjudication rather than rulemakings. Oh, and the cherry on top is that Comcast is currently arguing in federal court in California that the FCC does have jurisdiction over these matters.

Comcast: No, those clauses don't give the FCC jurisdiction to act. Plus, Free Press has changed it's story since its original complaint where it asked the Commission to enforce the policy statement. It is now asking the Commission to enforce particular statutes.

Free Press: We haven't changed our story, and it doesn't matter regardless. Oh and by the way, we also have a bunch of legal scholars that say that the Commission has jurisdiction.

Comcast: The part of the statutes you cite are just preambles and statutory statements of "policy", which the D.C. Circuit Court says are "not an operative part of the statute and [do] not enlarge or confer powers on administrative agencies or officers."

Media Access Project: Comcast was warned that the FCC would do this if they discriminated. Oh, and the Sixth Circuit seems to say that there is yet another statutory basis for jurisdiction.

Free Press: Yeah, what they said.

Comcast: We've retained a DC law firm which says that the FCC does not have jurisdiction.

Free Press: I think we've stated our case.


Does this mean that the Net Neutrality crowd "won"?
Getting the FCC to take action on this issue was a battle, but not the war. Many considered it unthinkable that anything would happen on this front until the next administration. This moves the ball in their direction but the game is far from over. Free Press has already posted two things on their blog in celebration.

What did the Net Neutrality crowd win?
It's unclear exactly what is in the order. According to news reports, it doesn't include a fine on Comcast. It probably includes requirements for them to stop doing whatever they've been doing, and to clearly disclose their "network management" practices. This is far from a broad neutrality mandate. The order probably won't lend a great deal of clarity to the question of what constitutes "reasonable network management." There is no broader rule from the commission, which would likely carry more power and clarity than the ad hoc approach of adjudication. There is certainly nothing with the force of statute.

What Happens Next?
Comcast sues the FCC. This will happen immediately. The case will go directly to Appeals court because suits always skip District court when they're appealed from the FCC. Comcast will argue many of the same things they argued in the proceeding. They will discuss how the Brand X case placed broadband clearly within "deregulated" Title I. Title I is essentially the introduction to the Communications Act, and is pretty thin on any details. Comcast will attack whatever statutory ground the FCC claims for its decision. This will come down to questions like whether the Commission can construe general language of Title I to give them authority to take the specific actions in the order, or whether other sections of the Act which appear to apply to other technologies (like common carriers) can actually apply to cable. They might even get down-and-dirty and start talking about the 1979 decision FCC v. Midwest Video Corp. decision that said that the Commission did not have jurisdiction to impose common carriage on cable because cable was a “broadcast” service. Who knows how this will come out, but Declan McCullaugh over at CNet concludes (without much analysis) that the FCC "probably can't police" the order. In the meantime, the stock price of Sandvine (the company that makes Comcast's "traffic shaping" hardware) will probably continue to tank.

But what about nipples?
I'm glad you asked. The recent 3rd Circuit decision invalidating the FCC's finding of indecency in the "wardrobe malfunction" incident actually relates to the current situation. In the decision, the Court found that the FCC's fine was "arbitrary and capricious" and that there was no clear statutory basis nor precedent for the fine. Some of Comcast's arguments are sure to echo this reasoning, and they appear to feel emboldened by the 3rd Circuit decision even though the subject matter is quite different. [Update: Free Press et al. rebut this argument]

Where does this put the Net Neutrality fight?
Neutrality proponents have somewhat more confidence at the FCC when making complaints, and this has whole ordeal has probably put more fear in the hearts of broadband providers that would like to discriminate against traffic. The inevitable appeal provides another stage on which to debate neutrality. However, neutrality proponents don't have as strong of an argument that the FCC isn't doing anything so we need Congress to step in. Still, from all appearances, the next Congress will be far more open to the idea of legislation (although most people don't think it's going to happen in the first session).

Well Steve, what do you think?
Adam Thierer (from think tank Progress and Freedom Foundation) commented that this FCC decision is evidence that the regulatory sky is falling on liberty's head, and I replied. [Update: The PFF crew continues to pile on, with even the ideologically aligned Tim Lee telling everybody to chill out. Hance Haney can't help but get in on the bashing.]

Sunday, July 27, 2008

A Reply to Nachbar

All right, I'm in final stages of thesis editing and I thought I'd post some excerpts (excuse the still-rough footnotes). In today's excerpt, I discuss Thomas Nachbar's recent article The Public Network. I had initially read Nachbar's earlier version of this paper, which he presented at TPRC 2006. This version was entirely a historical accounting of open access mandates in communication law (or non-discrimination, depending on your personal preference). The paper was absolutely fundamental in my understanding of communications law. In this latest version, he adds substantial sections in which he analyzes present debates in net neutrality and spectrum auctions in light of his historical account. I disagree strongly with his conclusions.

***
Thomas Nachbar has argued that the ideal non-discrimination rule would prevent user-based discrimination but allow carriers to discriminate based on use. Under this regime, providers would be able to choose which services they support (and how they prioritize or discriminate among them) but they would be required to offer the same deal to everyone. Google could not pay for faster delivery than Yahoo. He reasons that user discrimination is easier to define than use discrimination, and less prone to regulatory abuse. He envisions this user-based neutrality as enforced by “standards” and not law or formal rules.[1] Furthermore, he claims that mandating uniform treatment of all packets would discourage applications that require prioritization or quality of service guarantees, making it a type of discrimination itself. To be sure, networks that treat all traffic uniformly make it more difficult to use certain applications. However, Nachbar’s core criticism appears to be not that someone will be choosing how to prioritize, but rather that in some neutrality regimes the government would be choosing. The best entity to choose, on his account, is the last-mile provider.

I disagree. Both use and user non-discrimination should be policy goals. It makes sound economic sense, it is consistent with historical non-discrimination precedent, and supports internet ethos of diverse uses and abundance of peers. Historically, use and user they were closely linked, and non-discrimination in one area could ensure non-discrimination in the other. For example, the Computer II rules mandated only that carriers not discriminate based on the phone number called. However, because of the simplistic circuit-switched technology (and the Carterphone right to attach devices), the rules ensured that use-based discrimination would not occur. Today, user-based discrimination protects only against a subset of harms, which in any event might already be addressable under antitrust doctrine.[2] It does not ensure that carriers support applications that they do not think will be profitable, or that compete with their non-internet offerings,[3] or that have not yet been invented. The problem is that surrendering use-based discrimination to last-mile providers would subject the general-purpose infrastructure in the interest carrier-profit-oriented incentives. In fact, it discriminates against users with business models or non-commercial modes of production that rely on technology uses not approved by the carrier.[4] The technology of the internet presents us with a choice we have not had to make historically because user-based neutrality has always implied use-based neutrality. Nachbar is prepared to give up on use neutrality, while I am not.

One way to maintain use-based non-discrimination by carriers would be to place prioritization control in the hands of the users. Most content/application providers have the opportunity to exercise this control by going to any number of competitive backbone providers. Different backbone providers ensure different levels of quality-of-service guarantees for common metrics like latency, throughput, and jitter (at least, up to the edge of their networks). End users, who are accessing this content or these applications or are connecting with each other in peer-to-peer fashion, do not have the ability to choose different prioritization via competitive providers or by specifying preferences to their provider. Indeed, even across-the-board neutrality may disfavor particular applications users wish to use, although this may be more appropriate and efficient than the last-mile provider’s blanket imposition of prioritization. A better solution would allow end users to easily control the prioritization of their own traffic, within the tier of service that they have purchased from their provider. Such a solution might implement a more sophisticated “Type of Service” style component into some layer of the network protocol, after being defined via a standards group such as the IETF.[5] This approach recognizes that different users have different usage needs, and places the control in their hands. It refuses to foreclose on new uses simply because the network owner did not think of them first, and catalyzes innovation at the “edges.” It is not true to absolute neutrality, but it is true to fundamental principles of non-discrimination and the internet ethos. Such an approach is unlikely to garner initial favor with carriers because it preserves user control, because it nevertheless resolves their “congestion” justification, and because it would take more technical and cooperational work than blunt discrimination. The appropriate policy path to this outcome might involve a use-neutrality mandate on last-mile providers with an exception for user-specified, standards-defined prioritization.

[1] It is unclear what these “standards” might be, other than the existing standards within the internet protocol, which have clearly been ignored in cases such as the recent Comcast/BitTorrent back-and-forth. As such, I am not sure what real force they would bring to bear on the situation aside from the unsustainable ad hoc complaint adjudication that the Commission is currently undertaking.
[2] I am skeptical and discuss this in detail earlier in the thesis.
[3] Although Nachbar seems to think so (eg telephony and video)
[4] eg, p2p
[5] Reed at the Harvard hearing. “There were a wide range of actual standards that would allow Comcast to manage and prioritize traffic, including diffserv, ECN, RED...” http://www.fcc.gov/broadband_network_management/022508/reed.pdf. One might add to this list the RSVP protocol (RFC 2205) and other methods that use flow-based prioritization (such as the method described in J. L. Adams, L. G. Roberts, A. Ijsselmuiden, Changing the Internet to support real-time content supply from a large fraction of broadband residential users, BT Technology Journal, v.23 n.2, p.217-231, April 2005). Some of these tools can be used by network operators to choose their own discriminatory practices, or they might be implemented in such a way as enable user-based control. Early internet engineer David Clark recently remarked (video recording available at http://www.fcc.gov/broadband_network_management/hearing-ma022508.html with quote at 4:24:45)

I don't like the idea of the ISP assigning quality of service to an application. If there is going to be any discrimination in terms of quality of service that's associated with some packets rather than others, I would prefer that the bits which select those packets for enhanced service be set by the user. The user could say 'this telephone call is really important. I want this telephone call to go through.' Imagine that in any given month, ten percent of your traffic could be high priority. You could say, 'this is it, I want it here.' It could be my choice as to whether that's a phone call or a game, or I'm trying to get a bid into eBay or whatever I'm trying to do. I would like the user to be able to assign those priorities. If you look at the way that internet telephony is done today, those bits are set by the phone device. It's not set by the ISP. It's the phone device that says, 'this is a phone call and therefore I will set these bits,' and if the ISP chooses to honor these bits then these packets will go through better. That's something that could be superimposed on top of the basic idea of usage quotas.

***

Wednesday, March 5, 2008

Audio from the Archive

It's been a long time since my last post, but I haven't fallen off the face of the earth. I've just been deep in thesis writing, as well as writing another paper on related topics. I hope to start publishing draft excerpts of my thesis here soon. In the meantime, I thought I'd post the following.

Last year, I produced a little audio montage for one of my courses. I'd completely forgotten about it until one of my classmates asked me for a copy. It's essentially a collection of clips related to contemporary internet policy debates, mixed over music by The Irresistible Force and Fila Brazilia.

You can listen to the MP3 here.

Voices include:
Studs Turkel, Documentarian (2001)
Marshall McLuhan (1967)
J.C.R. Licklider, Internet Engineer (1972)
Bell Labs Speech Synthesis Record (1962)
Bill Moyers (2006)
Senator Ted Sevens, R-AK (2006)
Lyndon B. Johnson (1967)
Edward R. Murrow (performed by David Straithairn)
Newton Minnow, FCC Chairman (1961)
Tim Wu, Columbia Law School (2006)
Yochai Benkler (2006)
Vinton Cerf, Internet Engineer (2006)

Wednesday, December 12, 2007

Internet Freedom and FUD

Adam Thierer has just written another thought-provoking post on TLF/PFF about the well-trod net neutrality debate. He is riffing on a ZDNet article by long-time net neutrality critic Larry Downes. The heart of his (and Larry's) argument is that the Internet should remain free from meddlesome regulation. I must say that I wholeheartedly agree. Where I take issue is whether most net neutrality proposals are necessarily meddlesome. This is a critical distinction too fine for Thierer or Downes.

I agree with Thierer on a great number of issues. He is spot-on when it comes to the perils of presumptive content regulation in the name of child protection. The risks of caving to DOPA-style regulation or other ill-conceived technological "solutions" to the issues that youth face online cannot be underestimated. Closing off vast swaths of the internet to the next generation of online artists, innovators, and entrepreneurs is self-evidently foolish. What Thierer fails to recognize is that the risks he envisions under the banner of "child protection" are paralleled in the world of net neutrality -- just not in the way that he assumes.

A libertarian of his flavor fears government at the expense of overlooking risks from industry. Thierer makes much of Bruce Owen's article from earlier this year, examining the legacy of railroad common carriage. I analyzed Owen's selective memory in an earlier blog post, and have yet to read a persuasive argument to the contrary. Weak rhetoric about "the value of keeping the government out of Internet content" is no more than FUD. Take the following statement, written by Downes and repeated by Thierer, for example -- "So why do the same civil-liberties groups that recognize the value of keeping the government out of Internet content want to open a loophole large enough to drive several Mack trucks through?"

Sounds like a bad idea to me.

But, let's take a look at this suspiciously hyperbolic language. In addition to the highly questionable railroad analogy, Downes rallies airline deregulation and Sarbanes-Oxley in favor of his argument. The role of the Civil Aviation Board (CAB) seems bewilderingly distant from the shape of any net neutrality legislation. No neutrality proposals include anything resembling routing requirements (very different from source-based prioritization), subsidization, or rate regulation (other than the eminently simple "you can't charge certain sources more than others"). Indeed, it's disingenuous to the extent that all net neutrality advocates embrace client-side speed price tiering. Sarbanes-Oxley might as well be a stab in the dark. Please explain, Downes, in what way the corporate costs of net neutrality compliance (adding no additional discriminatory technology) resemble SOX obligations?

Are we to fear government intervention in all of its instantiations? The Thierer rhetoric would certainly indicate so. If Downes believes that "the Internet has thrived in large part because it has managed to sidestep a barrage of efforts to regulate it..." he may wish to brush up on which title of the Communications Act governed last-mile internet access until 2005. The trouble is that the black-or-white government/liberty position undermines Thierer's position. To be sure, the PFF would like to see enhanced antitrust regulation of our communications infrastructure. Antitrust and ex ante rulemakings are both forms of government management. If Thierer/PFF is right, there must be an argument or normative reason why antitrust is a more promising check on the power of infrastructure owners than something like neutrality legislation.

If so, let's do away with the regulation-vs-liberty rhetoric and engage the alternatives on the merits. Why is open-ended ex post antitrust review more straightforward than clearly defined up-front rules? Why do the last two years of broadband consolidation argue against the prior ten years of common carriage that fostered the internet explosion? Why should the proven technological structure of the IP "hourglass" be upset in favor of uninhibited carrier discretion?

Monday, November 12, 2007

Why Manage?

Bruce Owen recently published an article in Cato's Regulation, entitled "Antecedents to Net Neutrality". Owen's central point is that net neutrality is simply a recapitulation of the failed telecommunications policy of common carriage. According to him, history shows that regulatory structures are subject to capture and that they do a worse job at enhancing social welfare than market forces—even when those forces create at best a Schumpeterian monopoly. Owen's article reads as though this is a new argument, but in reality it's just the latest salvo in the broadband access back and forth that he and Lessig have already had in the publication. (Incidentally, Owen's article is essentially a copy-paste from this earlier AEI-Brookings/Stanford working paper/Free State Foundation cross-post that has footnotes not present in the article version).

The fundamental question is whether history indeed shows that regulation of communications infrastructure fails and that alternatives provide greater benefit for the public. In short, why use regulatory rulemaking to manage communications when property or antitrust can manage it better?

The title of this blog comes from LBJ's remarks upon signing the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967. He explained that, "today our problem is not making miracles—but managing miracles. We might well ponder a different question: What hath man wrought—and how will man use his inventions?" He was speaking in the context of mass media dominated by the broadcast model, and governed by now-abandoned principles like the Fairness Doctrine. At the same time, he spoke of "a great network for knowledge—not just a broadcast system, but one that employs every means of sending and storing information that the individual can use." As predictions of the future go, this is pretty good. But, what about this notion of managing our communications miracles?

To begin with, we need to recognize that property-like rights assignment or antitrust oversight amounts to management just as much as regulatory rulemaking. The rhetoric of restrictive government regulation vs. free property markets is at best a false dichotomy and at worst a justification for arbitrarily picking winners. When it comes to media, and especially broadband access, we are not anywhere near the point at which scarcity has disappeared or at which competition has generated widespread consumer choice. In the interim, we are left with the difficult but necessary task of managing this remarkable invention—one way or another.

Owen posits that common carriage has been an historical failure, and that antitrust should intervene where markets fail. To be sure, net neutrality derives some of its power from the legacy common carriage. But is he right that common carriage in communications law has empirically failed?

Owens' retelling of history is remarkably selective. He begins with railroad regulation, the statutory source these principles. After concluding that over a century of railroad common carriage regulation resulted in "a series of highly discriminatory and dysfunctional regional transport cartels," he begins to discuss common carriage in the context of the U.S. v. AT&T antitrust proceedings in the early 1980's. It is not surprising that he locates his analysis in these proceedings, given his personal connection with the Department of Justice during that period, but such an angle hardly offers a representative view of the doctrine. All we truly learn from his account is that the DoJ analysis of AT&T was difficult, and that the antitrust-based remedies were imperfect.

One might seek instead to start with Title II of the Communications Act, the regulatory home of telecommunications common carriage, and then to focus on the most relevant examples. Most notable are the Computer Inquiry proceedings, which dealt with the interaction of long-held common carriage requirements and newly developing information services. In particular, the Computer II rulemaking sought to retain common carriage at the "basic" services layer (ie. placing a phone call) while allowing less controlled competition at the "enhanced" services layer (ie. ISPs and other dial-up services). Whereas most scholars recognize that Computer II allowed the discrimination-free operation of dial-up ISPs that facilitated the explosion of the internet, Owen inexplicably concludes that the rulemakings ended in "morasses of complex, unworkable, and ineffective or self-defeating regulations."

Perhaps Owen is thinking of other elements of the Computer Inquiries, or perhaps his assessment of the enhanced/basic distinction differs radically from prevailing opinion. He doesn't explain. Nevertheless, he assures us that in any event market competition will give consumers better services at lower costs. After all, telephone companies and cable companies already compete in the broadband market. On his telling, vertical integration and exclusive control over the "pipes" only increase providers' incentives to invest and improve market efficiency. Whether or not his claims about broadband competition hold water is a topic for another day, but either way this argument does little to bolster his weak historical account.

Of course, Computer II is only one example of the negotiation between common carriage and competition. A more nuanced analysis might seek to separate the particular discrimination-oriented policies from the monopoly-contingent clauses. Although net neutrality, in all its variations, derives much from common carriage, it is not synonymous with it. In fact, proponents themselves have criticized the technologically siloed regulatory system in which common carriage operates. The historical success and durability of Computer II contributes to that critique. Owen's accusation that advocates have "apparent ignorance of more than a century of economic and regulatory history" might well be turned back on him.

Why manage? In reality there is no choice. The question instead becomes "How to manage?" Certainly one approach is to defer judgment at all network layers to a market that is deemed to be "well functioning." Antitrust might serve as a backstop in this scenario. In order to decide whether this is the best approach, the policymaker must have a robust understanding of history as well as a nuanced conception of present circumstances. In this post I've addressed the particular historical claim that Owen makes. A richer reading of history would not only tell the full story of common carriage, but would probe the boundaries between the sometimes-competing and sometimes-complementary approaches. It would reference landmark cases like Brand X and Trinko. It would recognize that the debate involves even the device layer.

In future posts, I'll examine some of these cases and spend more time with the contemporary details. My simple motivation is the fact that communications policy affects how we communicate. As such, it is concerned with more than just the efficient exchange of goods and services. It is susceptible to ideological wrangling. It both sparks rhetoric and shapes the platform by which rhetoric is exchanged. The fact that communications is central to our nature as human beings is not only why we manage, but also why informed management matters.

[Update 12/29: I noticed via TLF that in this 2006 NYT Op-Ed Tim Lee made arguments similar to those made by Owens. I respect Tim's work and read most of his stuff, but on this issue his vision is just as myopic as Owens'.]